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CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE
REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Yilmaz Akyuz and Andrew Cornford
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva
     Recent financial crises, whose effects have been particularly severe in developing countries, have
led to a wide-ranging debate on international financial reform.  This debate has had to confront the
implications of the huge growth of international capital movements, one of whose consequences has
been the increased “privatization” of external financing for developing countries.  The paper begins
with surveys of major features of the post-war evolution of the system of governance of the
international financial system and of the principal trends in capital flows to developing countries
during the past three decades.  These set the stage for a selective review of appropriate policy
responses to international financial instability, with the main focus on proposals for remedying
structural and institutional weaknesses in the global financial architecture through such means as
greater transparency and improved disclosure, strengthened financial regulation and supervision,
more comprehensive and even-handed multilateral policy surveillance, and bailing in the private
sector by arrangements for orderly debt workouts.  In view of the continuing absence of effective
measures at the global level for dealing with financial instability, the paper puts special emphasis on
the maintenance by developing countries of national autonomy regarding policy towards capital
movements.
I.  INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND
THE GOVERNANCE OF CAPITAL FLOWS
The ideas underlying approaches to improving the governance of the international financial system
since 1945 have understandably been heavily influenced by the experience of the recent past.  Thus the
arrangements which emerged from planning during World War II and the negotiations following it
reflected the searing impact on thinkers and policy makers of the 1930s – the devastating declines in
employment and incomes of the Great Depression and the associated contraction in international trade,
the recourse to competitive devaluations and multiple currency practices, and the proliferation of bilateral
trade arrangements and exchange controls.  Similarly, much of policy makers’ energy immediately after
the war was focused on the international financing and payments requirements of the economic
reconstruction of Western Europe.  The very concepts used in discussion of policy issues involving the
international financial system tended to be based, explicitly or implicitly, on assumptions about its
functioning which reflected to a great extent the commonest categories of cross-border financial
transaction and prevalent rules and norms.  The concepts of international liquidity and of the various
possible instruments for its provision in this discussion, for example, were closely connected to their use
for international trade in goods and services and for the still relatively restricted categories of capital- 2 -
1 Offshore currency markets which, like offshore banking, lack a generally accepted precise definition, refer to financial
activities in currencies other than that of the country where they are located or between non-residents of this country (or to
activities characterized by both features).  Typically, they are free of many of the monetary controls and regulations which apply
to onshore markets, and benefit from tax advantages.
2 “By the time that the adjustable peg was abandoned, capital mobility had developed to the point where the Bundesbank
could take in well over $1 billion in an hour when the market had come to expect that another parity change was impending”
(Williamson, 1997: 50).
transaction which could be undertaken within the rules of the national regimes of most developed
countries during this period.
From the 1950s onwards there was an expansion of the international capital markets, driven partly
by the flows of international investment linked to post-war economic recovery but also stimulated by
the development of offshore currency markets where financial transactions were subject to much lighter
control.1  Countries were periodically (and from the second half of the 1960s increasingly frequently)
subjected to pressures due to surges of short-term capital flows between major currencies,2 surges which
eventually overwhelmed the Bretton Woods system of exchange rates.  Henceforth, while problems
associated with the financing and payments arrangements of trade and other current-account transactions
have remained an important concern in consideration of the functioning of the international financial
system (a statement which for obvious reasons applies a fortiori to matters associated with developing
countries participation in this system), increasing attention has been devoted to ways of handling,
controlling and responding to capital movements as these have continued to grow in size, unshackled
as they increasingly have been owing to the progressive liberalization of capital-account transactions in
the major industrial countries and to some extent elsewhere.
As is documented in the following section, this trend in the functioning of the international financial
system towards increased importance for private actors was eventually paralleled by an analogous one
in the character of developing countries’ external financing, with a rapid increase in the importance of
private flows during the 1970s and the 1990s (though one which experienced a set back owing to the debt
crisis in the 1980s).  The progressive integration of developing (and more recently transition) economies
into the network of international financial markets has had the consequence that the benefits and costs
of this increased “privatization” of these economies’ external financing has become a much more
important topic in debate concerning the international financial system.  Moreover, developments in the
1990s, especially the destabilizing spillovers on financial markets and firms of industrial countries from
the financial crises in Russia and East Asia and Russia, have provided additional impetus to this
tendency, so that the omission of the problems posed by capital movements for countries with “emerging
financial markets” is no longer conceivable in serious consideration of systemic reform of international
financial governance.
A comprehensive description of the main instruments and arrangements for this governance (and
thus also of the governance of international capital flows) is of course impossible in a paper of this- 3 -
3 In the planning for the post-war world, the organizations responsible for global economic governance were linked to the
United Nations, which would be responsible for the maintenance of peace.  The IMF and the World Bank are Specialized Agencies
of the United Nations under Article 57 of its Charter.  The United Nations has concluded agreements with them under Article 63,
recognizing them as independent international organizations.
4 Concerning this multiplicity of international economic organizations see, for example, Jackson (1997: chap. 2).
length, but a brief sketch of major features should facilitate understanding of the arguments which
follow.
The planning for the post-war world during World War II envisaged a set of organizations which
would deal with currency stability and international payments, economic reconstruction and the
advancement of less developed economies, and international trade and investment.  The negotiations
associated with this process eventually gave rise to the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT.3  But the
triad which emerged from Bretton Woods and its aftermath are merely the monoliths of a set of about
300 international organizations dealing with economic matters with memberships varying from the near
universal to the purely regional, some of which antedate World War II.4  Of the organizations other than
those which emerged from Bretton Woods the most important in the context of the governance of
international capital flows are the OECD, the EEC/EU, and the BIS.
Responsibility for international capital movements is not neatly assigned under this institutional
structure.  Indeed, the original structure did not include a global regime for capital movements, and no
such regime has yet emerged.  Instead at the global level there is a patchwork of rules and agreements
bearing directly or indirectly on several aspects of international investment and other financial flows but
one which still accommodates a considerable measure of national policy autonomy for the majority of
countries.  More comprehensive regimes, designed to liberalize international financial flows, have been
agreed in arrangements involving limited groups of countries such as the OECD, the EEC/EU, and the
BIS.
The only global regime applying to cross-border monetary transactions is that of the IMF but the
most important obligations in its Articles of Agreement relate to current and not capital transactions
(being set out in Articles VIII and XIV).  Concerning capital movements Article IV contains the
statement that one of the essential purposes of the international monetary system is to provide a
framework facilitating the exchange of capital among countries, a statement which is included among
general obligations regarding exchange arrangements.  The more specific references to capital transfers
in Article VI permit recourse to capital controls so long as they do not restrict payments for current
transactions, and actually give the Fund the authority to request a member country to impose contracts
to prevent the rise of funds from its general Resources Account to finance a large or sustained capital
outflow.  The World Bank has no direct responsibility for governance of the international financial
system.  However, it has participated as a source of financing in a number of the international bail-outs
put together in response to recent financial crises, and has provided financial and technical assistance
(often as a major ingredient of programmes linked to structural adjustment lending) to several countries- 4 -
5 For more detail see Akyüz and Cornford (1995).
6 Derogation from full compliance with the Code’s obligations is also possible if a country’s “economic and financial situation
justifies such a course”.  Once surrendered, however, this dispensation is no longer available.  The derogation, which inter alia
is intended to cover developing countries, has been used in various cases, for example by Greece, Iceland, Spain, Turkey and
Portugal (with respect to its overseas territories).  See OECD (1990: 21).
7 Prior to the 1988 directive, the EEC/EU’s regime for capital movements had provided governments some leeway for
restricting different categories of transaction, with liberalization obligations which were less stringent for short-term and potentially
speculative transactions.
as part of their efforts to upgrade and reform their financial sectors and their regimes of regulation and
supervision (now considered an important part of policies for preventing financial crises, as explained
below).  Until 1994 GATT likewise was assigned only very limited responsibility regarding the
functioning of the international financial system:  Articles XII–XV and section B of Article XVIII of the
Agreement permit the use of quantitative restrictions on imports by countries facing balance-of-payments
problems but in this context the judgement of the IMF is sought as to the validity of the reasons advanced
to support the imposition and maintenance of these restrictions.  The WTO agreement, while not giving
the new institution a major role in global financial governance, has nevertheless extended its remit
regarding international investment, in particular through the inclusion of the commercial presence of
(and thus the FDI of) services suppliers in the GATS.  Since the sectors covered by the GATS include
financial services, both the pace and the nature of the expansion of the global network of financial
markets will henceforth be significantly affected by commitments as to market access and national
treatment made in WTO negotiations.
Of the organizations or arrangements with more limited memberships both the OECD and the
EEC/EU have established regimes for capital flows.5  The OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital
Movements dates from 1961 and reflects the generally favourable view of its member states concerning
the free movement of capital.  The Code discriminates between two sets (or Lists) of capital movement,
and member countries authorize transactions in the two Lists subject only to reservations listed in an
Annex to the Code, and to derogations granted in certain circumstances such as the onset of serious
balance-of-payments problems.  One of the two Lists covers transactions generally regarded as more
sensitive owing, for example, to their short-term and potentially more speculative character, and is
consequently subject to greater flexibility as to the right to enter reservations.6  In the EEC/EU a 1988
directive abolished restrictions on capital movements between residents of EEC/EU countries subject only
to provisos concerning the right to control short-term movements during periods of financial strain and
to take the measures necessary for the proper functioning of systems of taxation, prudential supervision,
etc.7  The directive also stated that EEC/EU countries should endeavour to attain the same degree of
liberalization of capital movements vis-à-vis third countries as with other member countries.  Under the
directive governments retained the right to take protective measures with regard to certain capital
transactions in response to disruptive short-term capital movements but, since the introduction of the- 5 -
8 For a useful but not fully up-to-date survey of mechanisms for external payments support in the EEC, see  Edwards (1985:
326–346).  As part of the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union, the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, the
vehicle which administered short-term facilities under the heading of mutual external financial support, was dissolved and its
functions taken over by the European Monetary Institute (EMI).
9 See Article 3 of the statutes of the Bank for International Settlements.  For a useful summary of the history, structure,
functions and legal status of the BIS, see  Edwards (1985: 52–63).  Until recently the principal shareholders of the BIS were 28
predominantly West European central banks, those of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom holding over 50 per
cent of the votes.  The United States Federal Reserve participates in meetings and committees linked to the BIS without being a
shareholder.  As a response to the increasingly global character of the international financial cooperation in which the BIS and
bodies linked to it play an increasingly important role, in September 1996 the BIS invited nine additional central banks to become
shareholders:  those of China, Brazil, Hong Kong (China), India, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia
and Singapore.
single currency, for the countries adopting it such measures may only be taken towards capital
movements to or from third countries.  The EEC/EU also made available to member countries various
types of external payments support both for the purpose enabling participants in its exchange-rate
mechanism (ERM) to keep their currencies within prescribed fluctuation limits and for other
circumstances threatening orderly conditions in the market for a member country’s currency.  Since the
introduction of the single currency the application of these arrangements has been substantially restricted
but experience of their use remains of interest to other regional groupings contemplating the
establishment of mechanisms for mutual external financial support.8
The BIS was established in 1930 “to promote the cooperation of central banks and to provide
additional facilities for international financial operations; and to act as trustee or agent in regard to
international financial settlements entrusted to it”.9  Since the 1970s the BIS has become the principal
forum and provided the secretariat support for a number of bodies established to reduce or manage the
risks in cross-border banking transactions.  The best known of these bodies is the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision established to promote banking stability through the promotion of strengthened
regulation and improved cooperation between national supervisors.  Others include the Committee on
the Global Financial System (until February 1999 known as the Euro-Currency Standing Committee)
established to monitor international banking developments and to disseminate data on the subject from
national creditor sources (a source of warnings as early as 1996 concerning the dangers of the increased
short-term borrowing of certain East Asian countries), and the Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems, the principal focus of whose work is the timely settlement of large-scale financial transfers but
which has also more recently begun to devote attention to the implications of electronic money.  While
the Basle bodies are not responsible for setting rules for international capital movements as such, their
work is designed to strengthen the defences of financial firms both individually and in the aggregate
against destabilization due to cross-border transactions and risk exposures.  In its work on financial
firms’ involvement in securities transactions the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has often
collaborated with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which has a
membership consisting of securities regulators and exchanges and which has gradually extended its remit
from one concentrating primarily on information sharing to the setting and promulgation of standards- 6 -
10 See, for example, the survey of global policy actions in UNCTAD (1996b: Annex, sect. F) and Cornford (1996) (which
is a review article of the book of papers generally more sympathetic to Tobin’s proposal (Ul Haque et al., 1996).
11 The more ambitious proposals include that for an International Credit Insurance Corporation, which would guarantee
international loans for a modest fee, while setting a ceiling on the amount of borrowing by particular countries which it was willing
to insure.  Of the ameliorative proposals, that for raising the costs of international interbank lending is actually discussed below
in section IV.D.1, and others are designed to achieve objectives such as the slowing of disinvestment in developing-country stocks
by mutual funds.  For a longer discussion see UNCTAD (1998a: chap. IV, sect. C.4).
for the functioning of exchanges and securities firms and for surveillance of cross-border securities
transactions.  One other recently established body, the Financial Stability Forum (which is describes in
more detail below), has a secretariat located in Basle, and is chaired by the General Manager of the BIS.
Other regional organizations have remits bearing in various ways on international capital
movements:  various groups of banking supervisors other than the Basle Committee (both regional and
comprising offshore financial centres) deal with regulatory issues affecting their members, typically
maintaining close contact in this context with the Basle Committee; and in Asia there are institutions and
arrangements which may eventually come to play roles similar to those of the EEC/EU in the areas of
mutual consultation and external payments support, namely the Executive Meeting of East Asia and
Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) (which, inter alia, monitors foreign exchange markets in the region),
swap mechanisms among ASEAN countries, and a web of bilateral repurchase agreements between
monetary authorities of the region under which an authority may exchange its United States Treasury
securities for dollars needed to support its currency.
A great many features of the current international financial system have a significant (even if often
only indirect) bearing on international capital flows.  Thus proposed reforms of this system can generally
be expected to affect the scale and character of these flows.  Any discussion such as that which follows
is necessarily selective, and many readers may feel that important ideas have been only touched upon
or completely omitted.  The survey here concerns policies which have been at the centre of discussion
(particularly concerning economies with emerging financial markets) since the East Asian crisis of 1997
but even so is not comprehensive.  Some readers may feel disappointed at the absence of discussion of
exchange-rate regimes, of proposals for tighter control of international lending and portfolio investment
at the source, or of the tax on foreign-exchange transactions originally proposed by James Tobin as an
instrument for limiting the volatility of currency markets and capital movements.  Concerning the latter
the authors had expressed their scepticism on a number of occasions before the outbreak of the East
Asian crisis, which has not changed their views.10  Regarding tighter controls on external financial flows
at their source the more ambitious proposals would appear typically to have features which are an
obstacle to their adoption, while the ameliorative ones which might face less resistance are unlikely to
so reduce financial instability as to eliminate the need for other major changes on the agenda of reform.11
As to exchange-rate regimes, for reasons explained at greater length elsewhere, the authors are not
convinced, unlike many other commentators, that this crisis furnished decisive arguments against- 7 -
12 For a more extended discussion see UNCTAD (1998a: Part One, chap. IV, sect. C.6) and UNCTAD (1999b: chap. VI,
sect. B.1).
13 One simple example, pointed out by Robert Merton, is the way in which cross-border swaps of income flows make possible
the taking of positions in foreign assets (in Merton’s example stocks) by a country’s investors without their purchasing the
underlying assets involved, which may be prohibited by the country’s regime for capital-account transactions.  See Mason,
Merton, Perold, and Tufano (1995: 4–7).
14 New situations in banking and finance often lead to renewed attention to, or rediscovery of, old ideas, and in the context
of possible future techniques for stabilizing the value of assets used for payment and settlement one can envisage renewed interest
in linking international monetary policy to stabilization of goods or commodity prices, as proposed to the first UNCTAD
conference in 1964 by Kaldor et al. (1964), or much earlier on by Benjamin Graham in Graham (1944).
managed flexibility for currencies (so long as it is accompanied by effective management of external
liabilities).  The way in which currency regimes were managed in certain East Asian countries (in effect
through pegging to the United States dollar) doubtless played a role in the unfolding of the crisis.  But
in conditions of high capital mobility no exchange-rate regime can guarantee stable and competitive rates.
Freely floating exchange rates and rigidly fixed ones (currency boards) each impose costs of their own,
the one introducing considerable uncertainly into a country’s relations with its trading and investment
partners and the other sharply (and almost certainly for many countries unacceptably) reducing national
policy autonomy.12
As is implicit in the remarks opening this section, ideas concerning international financial reform
have a way of always being provisional owing to their susceptibility to being at least partly overtaken
by developments on the ground.  Cross-border financial transactions – current as well as capital – have
been greatly transformed by financial innovation in recent years, and this process can be expected to
continue.  Derivatives are often cited in this context owing to the way in which they can be used to get
around the spirit, if not the letter, of regulation of capital-account transactions.13  In the not too distant
future it is possible that new techniques of payment and settlement of cross-border transactions made
possible by computer technology will be a source of new challenges to techniques of monetary policy
and to tax systems. These challenges may involve the design of rules for the new arrangements for such
payment and settlement, techniques of valuation for instruments such as financial assets other than
money used for this purpose, and the intervention in the markets for financial and possibly other assets
required to avoid levels of price instability capable of disrupting these arrangements.14  The challenges
will inevitably affect both regimes for international capital movements and the agenda for international
financial reform.- 8 -
15 For the terminology regarding capital flows in this paper see the notes to table 1.
16 In this context it should be recalled that FDI includes not only non-debt-creating flows but also intercompany debt
transactions.
II.  TRENDS IN EXTERNAL FINANCING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
As shown in table 1 and charts 1–2, the size, composition and distribution of external capital
inflows15 to developing countries have all undergone fundamental shifts during the past three decades.
In the period until the early 1970s the most important source of external financing for developing
countries was official loans and aid (though during the period from the 1950s onwards FDI frequently
accounted for 20-30 per cent of their external financing and there was also an expansion in the share
accounted for by export credits).  This was based on the recognition that the ability of developing
countries to fill their resource gaps through commercial borrowing on market terms was severely limited.
Official financing continued to expand rapidly in the 1970s but there was also a rapid expansion of
private financial flows, primarily in the form of credits by banks in industrial countries, which served
to recycle the surpluses of major oil exporters that emerged after the sharp increases in oil prices during
1973–1974.  This expansion came to an end in 1982 with a rapid withdrawal of bank lending, resulting
in a generalized debt crisis in the third world and a lost decade for growth and development.  During the
rest of the 1980s capital inflows to developing countries remained virtually stagnant:  while private
financing fell sharply, official development assistance increased only moderately compared to the 1970s.
Until 1997 the decade of the 1990s witnessed a strong expansion in private capital inflows to developing
countries.  The increase was sufficiently rapid to more than offset the downward trend in official flows,
and was greatly influenced by rapid liberalization of markets and privatization of economic activity in
most developing countries.  An important proportion of private capital has taken the form of non-debt
creating flows, notably but not exclusively FDI.16
Net capital inflows to developing countries have risen by more than twenty-fold in nominal terms
since 1970.  In real terms the increase in total net inflows is much less impressive.  Measured in relation
to the import price index of developing countries (i.e. in terms of its purchasing power over foreign
goods), for example, the increase in net capital inflows during the same period is about five-fold.  More
importantly, measured in terms of the share of output of the recipient countries, the recent surge in
capital flows represents only a recovery from the stagnant levels of the 1980s rather than an increase over
the levels attained during the years preceding the debt crisis.  Excluding China, on average the total
inflow of capital to developing countries as a proportion of their combined GNP was indeed lower
during 1990-1998 than during 1975-1982.  Similar trends are also observable for net transfers, namely
net capital inflows less net factor payments abroad including interest payments on external debt and
profit remittances which is a broad measure of foreign resources available to finance- 9 -
Table 1
Aggregate net capital inflow to developing countries,




Including China  4.91 2.87 5.00
Excluding China 5.45 2.97 4.22
Official inflows 1.58 1.57 1.03
ODA grants 0.53 0.62 0.56
Other official 1.05 0.96 0.47
Private inflows 3.33 1.29 3.97
Non-debt-creating inflows 0.42 0.55 2.21
FDI 0.42 0.53 1.67
Portfolio equity 0.00 0.02 0.54
Bonds 0.11 0.05 0.52
Bank credit 2.46 0.44 1.17
Short-term 1.10 0.10 0.72
Long-term 1.36 0.34 0.44
Memo item:
Portfolio inflows 0.12 0.07 1.06
Interest payments 1.49 2.58 1.79
Profit remittances 0.93 0.54 0.56
Net capital transfers 2.48 -0.26 2.65
Sources: UNCTAD secretariat estimates, based on World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1999 (CD-Rom, Washington
DC, 1999).
Definition of Different Types of Capital Flows
There is ambiguity in terminology for the different kinds of international capital flows.  The same terms used by different institutions
or writers often cover different categories of capital transactions, while the same categories are sometimes referred to in different
terms.  The definitions used throughout this paper are as follows:
Capital inflow:  This term refers to the acquisition of domestic assets by non-residents (plus grants). Sales of domestic assets
are defined as a negative capital inflow.  Thus the term net capital inflow denotes acquisition minus sales of domestic assets by
non-residents.  The types of asset included  in these flows vary according to the institution publishing the data.  The term net
resource flows used by the World Bank in its Global Development Finance, for example, refers to capital transactions by non-
residents, but excludes assets that give rise to short-term debt.  In the IMF Balance of Payment Statistics, capital inflows are the
items included in the capital and financial accounts of the balance of payments, comprising mainly credit items (such as debt
forgiveness and migrants' transfers) under the heading of “capital transfers”, “direct investments” in the country concerned, and
the liability items under “portfolio investment” and “other investment” (which includes both short-term and long-term debt in such
forms as bank loans, other types of trade credit, and borrowing from IMF).
Capital outflow:  This term refers to the acquisition of foreign assets by residents.  Sales of foreign assets are defined as a
negative capital outflow.  Thus the term net capital outflow denotes acquisitions minus sales of foreign assets by residents.  In the
IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, capital outflows consist of the debit items under the heading of “capital transfers”, “direct
investment abroad”, and the asset items under “portfolio investment” and “other investment”.
Net capital flow: This term refers to total net capital inflow less total net capital outflow as defined above.  It is positive when net
inflows exceed net outflows.
Net transfer:  This term refers to net capital inflows less net factor payments abroad; the latter include interest payments on external
debt as well as profit remittances.  Net transfer is thus a broad measure of a country's capacity to finance its trade deficits.Source and definitions: See table 1.
Developing countries: net capital inflows by type of flow, 1975-1998
























































9%Source and definitions: See table 1.
a  Regional classification of the World Bank except for Europe, which comprises Malta and Turkey only.
Developing countries: net capital inflow, by regiona, 1975-1998




































































17 The emerging markets comprise Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Republic of
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
trade deficits.  These too have remained at about the same level in the 1990s as in the period before the
outbreak of the debt crisis.
As shown in chart 1, there have also been a series of major shifts in the composition of capital
inflows since the mid-1970s.  From 1975 until the early 1980s, private capital accounted for almost two-
thirds of total inflows, but after 1982 its share fell to less than 50 per cent not so much because of a rise
in official finance as because of a collapse in private inflows, notably international bank lending.  In the
1990s the surge in private flows and the decline in official financing have meant that private capital has
accounted for 80 per cent of total capital inflows to developing countries.  In nominal terms official
financing drifted around $40 billion, only a little above the levels attained during the years of debt crisis.
As shown in chart 2, these changes in the composition of capital inflows as between public and private
sources have been accompanied by shifts in their distribution among developing countries and regions.
In particular, since official flows tend to favour poorer developing countries and regions, their decline
relative to that of private capital flows has been a major determinant of the trend in the share of different
groups of developing countries.  Thus, the shares of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the major
recipients of official finance, increased, while that of Latin America declined sharply after 1982
compared to the pre-debt crisis years owing to the drying-up of private flows.  However, during the
1990s the movement has been in the opposite direction, the share of East Asia continuing its rise of the
past three decades until the setback of the financial crisis which begun in 1997.  The shift in the
composition of capital inflows towards private capital has been accompanied by concentration in a small
number of developing countries, mainly the so-called emerging markets.17  While the 20 countries that
constitute this group received, on average, 40 per cent of total net capital inflows during the whole period
of the past two decades, their share went up to over 90 per cent in the 1990s, leaving the remaining 10
per cent to be shared among the rest of the developing world.
There has also been a considerable shift in the relative importance of different categories of private
inflow.  From mid-1970s until the outbreak of the debt crisis of the 1980s bank credits constituted three
quarters of total private capital inflows to developing countries, while the rest was accounted for by FDI.
This pattern changed drastically after the debt crisis when bank loans collapsed and FDI took the highest
share in total private inflows.  In the 1990s the revival of bank lending has been concentrated mainly on
the Asian emerging markets; FDI has accelerated rapidly and portfolio investment has emerged as a
major form of private inflow.  These changes have also been associated with the increased share of the
private sector as borrower.  Before the debt crisis, the share in total external borrowing of private flows
not covered by an official guarantee in the recipient country was only about 15 per cent.  After 1982 this
ratio fell even further before rising rapidly in the 1990s both in absolute terms and in relation to public
and publicly guaranteed flows, exceeding the latter from 1995 onwards. However, this trend was- 13 -
18 If unrecorded net capital outflows (errors and omissions), a substantial proportion of which generally consists of residents’s
purchases of foreign assets, are added to recorded flows, the proportions are even higher.
reversed after outbreak of the East Asian crisis:  non-guaranteed borrowing almost disappeared, while
public and publicly guaranteed debt shot up, largely as a result of socialization of private debt.
Net capital inflows received by developing countries from non-residents do not necessarily give
the amount available for financing current-account deficits and closing resource gaps.  Account also
needs to be taken of net capital outflows by residents.  The importance of capital outflows through
acquisition of assets abroad depends, inter alia, on the capital account regime adopted by the countries
concerned.  During the past 10 years, a growing number of developing countries have liberalized
outward capital flows, enabling their residents to shift funds to foreign financial markets for short-term
investment as well as for outward FDI and the purchase of long-term financial assets.  However, such
outflows can also occur under more restrictive capital-account regimes in the form of capital flight.  Net
capital outflows in fact constitute an increasing part of offsetting financial transactions, as can be seen
from table 2.  In the emerging markets, for each dollar of net inflow there was a net outflow of 14 cents
in the 1980s and one of almost 24 cents in the 1990s, while for developing countries .as a whole this
share has more than doubled since the beginning of the 1990s.18
The coexistence of capital inflows with outflows is a natural outcome of global financial
integration.  It is a widespread phenomenon in the developed world, reflecting in part the global reach,
portfolio diversification and risk management of financial institutions.  It can also reflect the disparate
behaviour of different categories of financial flows.
Cross-border financial activities have increasingly become a feature of financial institutions in
emerging markets.  Around 300 banking entities from 10 leading developing countries were operating
in OECD countries in 1996 (Cornford and Brandon, 1999: tables 1 and 2).  Thus opening of the capital
account in emerging markets presents profitable opportunities for portfolio diversification not only for
lenders and investors in industrial countries but also for asset holders in these markets themselves.  It
also allows businesses to take positions abroad in order to hedge against exchange-rate risks.
Furthermore, some developing countries have become significant providers of FDI in recent years, with
the cumulative outward flow reaching $52 billion during 1991–1996, or 21 per cent of total net capital
outflows from developing countries (World Bank, 1998: table 1.11).  However, an important part of
outflows, as of inflows, also consists of liquid capital driven by short-term arbitrage opportunities.
Another important category of offsetting financial transactions is reserve accumulation.  During the
1990s more than 20 per cent of total net capital inflows were absorbed by additions to reserves in both
developing countries as a whole and in the emerging markets.  For the latter there has been a large
increase in such additions from a level of only 3 per cent in the 1980s to one similar to the developing-
country average.  So long as private capital flows are subject to the control of recipient countries, such
flows can be expected to be closely related to imports and current-account financing.  The need to- 14 -
Table 2
Net capital inflow, current-account and offsetting financial transactions in developing countries
and 16 emerging-market countriesa
All developing countries Emerging-market countries
1990–1994 1995–1998 1990–1998 1980–1989b 1990–1997
Billions of dollars
Net capital inflow 825.8 1064.9 1890.6 355.3 1083.8
Net capital outflow -142 -435.3 -577.2 -49.6 -256.2
Net capital flow 683.8 629.6 1313.4 305.7 827.6
BoP errors and omissions  -49.9 -106.3 -156.2 -39.5 -53.2
Change in reservesc -221.2 -216.5 -437.7 -10.6 -231.6
Current-account balanced -412.7 -306.8 -719.5 -255.6 -542.7
Percentage of net inflow
Net outflow 17.2 40.9 30.5 14.0 23.6
BoP errors and omissions 6.0 10.0 8.3 11.1 4.9
Change in reservesc 26.8 20.3 23.2 3.0 21.4
Current-account balanced 50.0 28.8 38.0 71.9 50.1
Percentage of net flow
BoP errors and omissions 7.3 16.9 11.9 12.9 6.4
Change in reservesc 32.3 34.4 33.3 3.5 28.0
Current-account balanced 60.4 48.7 54.8 83.6 65.6
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1999 (CD-Rom); IMF, World Economic Outlook, October
1998; IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics, various issues.
Note: For definitions see table 1.
a Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey. 
b Excluding 1987 and 1988, which were years with current-account surpluses.
c A minus sign indicates an increase in reserves. 
d The sum of net capital flow, Balance of Payments Statistics errors and omissions and change in reserves.
maintain a certain level of reserves would then arise from time lags between payments for imports and
receipts from exports and from miscellaneous temporary disequilibria in the current balance of payments.
Traditionally, reserves covering on average three or four months’ imports are considered as adequate
for such purposes, and even smaller reserves would be needed to the extent that governments are more
willing to respond to current-account disturbances by exchange-rate adjustments.  The trend in
developing countries has, however, been to accumulate reserves, leading to levels well above the
traditional norm.  Indeed, despite policy reforms designed to ensure greater flexibility in the adjustment
of exchange rates to market conditions, their reserve holdings have tended to rise in both absolute and- 15 -
19 These costs, which are explained in more detail in section IV.B, can be estimated for the additional reserves accumulated
by developing countries in 1990–1997 to have amounted to about $50 billion (or about 2.5 per cent of total net inflows during the
period).  See UNCTAD (1999b: 124, footnote 15).
20 The short-term external financing displaying such higher volatility comprises portfolio investment in equity and short-term
debt instruments, such as treasury bills, short-term loans other than trade credits, changes in non-residents’ domestic-currency
holdings and deposits, and changes in other short-term external liabilities of banks.  For a more detailed discussion see UNCTAD
(1996b, chap. V, sect. D).
21 For further details concerning some of these crises see UNCTAD (1998a: Part One, Annex to chap. III).
relative terms during the past two decades, a policy involving significant costs.19  For the developing
countries as a whole, the increase in reserves from 1990 to 1998 amounted to 60 per cent of the total
increase in their import bill during the same period. 
These increases would appear to be a response to the instability of private capital flows,
especially short-term bank loans and much portfolio investment.  The instability is exemplified by major
constituents of these two categories of external financing for developing countries which displayed much
sharper fluctuations during the 1990s than total net capital inflows, increasing more than 2.5 times more
rapidly during 1988-1995 but decreasing no less than 83 per cent in 1995-1998, while the total net inflow
declined only 12 per cent.  Such fluctuations reflect the boom-bust cycle of external financing in the
1990s and the impact of the associated financial crises.20
III.  FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND CRISES
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system increased global capital mobility has been
accompanied by greater frequency of financial crises in both developed and developing countries alike.
The episodes of financial instability and crisis in industrial countries include the banking and real estate
crises in the United States lasting more than a decade from the late 1970s, the major slumps in the global
stock market in 1987 and 1989, several episodes of extreme instability in the currency markets of
industrial countries of which an outstanding instance was the currency crisis of the European Monetary
System (EMS) in 1992, and the ongoing instability in Japanese financial markets that started with the
bursting of the bubble in the early 1990s, whilst those in developing countries include the Southern Cone
crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the debt crisis of the 1980s, the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995, the
East Asian crisis beginning in 1997, the Russian crisis of 1998, and a number of other more limited
currency and banking crises.21
There are, however, important differences between industrial and developing countries in the
nature and effects of financial instability and crises.  Experience shows that in developing countries
reversal of external capital flows and sharp declines in the currency often threaten domestic financial
stability.  Similarly, domestic financial crises usually translate into currency turmoil, payments difficulties- 16 -
22 For two surveys of the voluminous literature on the subject see “The Exchange Rate System” in UNCTAD (1987) and
Rosenberg (1996), especially chaps. II and XII (the latter discusses evidence concerning trend – following behaviour of currency
traders).
23 Dollarization adds further to vulnerability since it effectively eliminates the difference between residents and non-residents
in the determination of the profitability of their investments and their ease of access to foreign assets.
and even external debt crises.  By contrast, currency turmoil in industrial countries since the advent of
more flexible exchange rates in the 1970s has frequently involved large movements of rates concentrated
into short periods. These movements, which result from buying and selling decisions by economic actors
in currency markets often taken with little regard for indicators of countries’ fundamentals (such as
relative price levels, microeconomic performance, and the stance of macroeconomic policies), generally
impose costs on the real economy and can lead to significant misalignments, that is to say levels of the
exchange rate which, at reasonably full employment for the economy in question, are inconsistent with
a sustainable external payments position.22  But such turmoil does not usually spill over into domestic
financial markets, nor do domestic financial disruptions necessarily lead to currency and payments crises.
These differences between developing and developed countries stem from a number of factors.  First,
the size of developing-country financial markets is small, so that entry or exit of even medium-size
investors from industrial countries is capable of causing considerable price fluctuations, even though
their placements in these markets account for a small percentage of their total portfolios.  Furthermore,
differences in the net foreign asset position and the currency denomination of external debt play a crucial
role.23  Here the vulnerability of developing countries is greater because of their typically higher net
external indebtedness and higher shares of their external debt denominated in foreign currencies.  The
vulnerability of the domestic financial system is increased further when external debt is owed by the
private sector rather than by sovereign governments.
A number of common features have marked the history of the post-Bretton Woods crises.  First,
many of them have been preceded by liberalization of the economy, notably the financial sector.  Second,
all episodes of currency instability have been started by a sharp increase in capital inflows followed by
an equally sharp reversal.  Such swings in flows are related to internal or external policy changes that
produce divergences in domestic financial conditions relative to those of the rest of the world, often
initially reflected in interest-rate differentials and prospects of capital gains.  Reversals of capital flows
are frequently, but not always, associated with a deterioration in the macroeconomic conditions of the
recipient country.  This deterioration often results from the effects of capital inflows themselves such
as overvaluation of the exchange rate, excessively rapid credit expansion, and speculative bubbles in
asset prices.  But the deterioration is also generally influenced by external developments affecting interest
rates and exchange rates in international markets as much as by shifts in domestic macroeconomic
policies.  Finally, financial crises tend to be associated more closely with certain types of financial flow
and with certain classes of lenders and borrowers than others.- 17 -
However, currency and financial crises in emerging markets have occurred under varying
macroeconomic conditions.  They have occurred when current-account deficits were large and
unsustainable (Mexico and Thailand), but also when such deficits were relatively small (Indonesia and
Russia).  Although significant overvaluation has often been characteristic of countries experiencing
currency turmoil (Mexico, Russia and Brazil, all of which used the exchange rate as a nominal anchor
to bring down inflation), this has not always been the case:  for instance, in most East Asian countries
the appreciation of the currency was moderate or negligible.  Similarly, while in some cases crises were
associated with large budget deficits (Russia and Brazil), in others the budget was balanced or in surplus
(Mexico and East Asia).  Finally, crises occurred when external debt was owed primarily by the public
sector (Brazil and Russia) or primarily by the private sector (East Asia).
Financial crises in developing countries are all characterized by a rush of investors and creditors
to exit and a consequent financial panic.  Indeed, whatever the proximate causes of financial crises or
the events that trigger attacks on currencies, international investors and creditors of developing countries
tend to manifest herd-like behaviour in exiting as well as in investing or lending.  The debt crisis of the
1980s witnessed a drastic cutback in lending by international banks to sovereign debtors, while during
the 1995 Mexican crisis the rush for the exits by international creditors took the form of rapid liquidation
of government paper and conversion of the proceeds into dollars.  Again, in the more recent turmoil in
East Asia, the refusal to roll over short-term loans together with the attempt of unhedged debtors to avoid
exchange-rate losses were the principal factors deepening the crisis.  Creditor overreaction to debtors’
financial difficulties is often explained in terms of a collective-action problem.  Even though the creditors
as a group are better off if they continue to roll over their maturing claims on a debtor, an individual
lender or investor has an incentive to exit.  Without access to liquidity a debtor entity is then forced to
curtail operations or to resort to distress sales of assets, which in turn lower its income and wealth,
thereby further constraining its ability to service debt and hence damaging the interests of creditors as
a group.
A generalized debt run by international creditors triggered by a loss of confidence can easily turn
a liquidity problem into widespread insolvencies and defaults by altering key asset prices, interest rates
and exchange rates.  In the absence of a large stock of reserves or access to international liquidity, the
ability of a debtor developing country to repay its entire stock of short-term external debt on demand is
no greater than the ability of a bank to meet a run by its depositors.  In the case of bank lending,
withdrawal of loans by foreign creditors is likely to trigger a rush by unhedged private debtors into
foreign currency as they seek to pay debt or cover their open positions, and may also lead to speculative
selling of the currency by residents.  This in turn drives down the foreign-exchange value of the domestic
currency and raises interest rates, making it more difficult for debtors to service their debt, forcing them
to liquidate assets and thereby deepening the debt-deflation process.  Debt runs by foreign creditors are
often also associated with a flight from non-debt instruments held by both residents and non-residents,- 18 -
notably from the equity market.  Since such investors face a decline in prices when they attempt to
liquidate their holdings, the selling pressure in the currency market may be weakened.  Moreover, since
they would also suffer from depreciations, they may have less inducement to exit.  However, investor
overreaction can none the less still amplify destabilizing feedbacks between equity and currency markets.
IV.  POLICY RESPONSES
Some of the possible lines of defence against financial crises involve action at the national level.
These include domestic macroeconomic policies, particularly monetary and interest-rate policies, to
restore market confidence and halt currency runs, as well as hedging through keeping sufficient foreign-
exchange reserves and credit lines.  Recent experience has pointed to serious weaknesses of
macroeconomic policy as a response to currency runs and banking crises.  Reliance on foreign exchange
reserves and credit lines is likely to be costly and to afford at best partial protection.  As a result attention
has increasingly turned to structural and institutional weaknesses in the global financial architecture
regarding the prevention and management of financial crises, giving rise to an international debate on
its reform.  Much of this debate has concentrated on five issues, namely (a) transparency, disclosure and
early warning systems; (b) financial regulation and supervision; (c) surveillance of national policies; (d)
an international lender of last resort; and (e) orderly debt workouts, and these will be the focus of the
discussion which follows.
Measures under these headings can help both to prevent and manage financial crises, and a clear
distinction cannot always be made between these two objectives.  This is true, for example, of banking
crises where strengthened financial regulation and supervision are manifestly directed at meeting
objectives regarding both prevention and management.  It is also true for currency crises where measures
such as provision of international liquidity or orderly debt workouts can help to avoid the build-up of
external financial fragility and thus to deter attacks on currencies, while at the same time allowing a
greater scope for managing such crises and limiting the resulting damage to the economy.  Measures can
be taken at global, national or regional levels, though not all clearly belong only to one of these levels.
Surveillance of national policies, for example, can take place at both the first and the last of the three
levels mentioned.  Moreover, in the case of policies in areas such as financial regulation and supervision,
even though action generally takes place at the national level, in recent years their appropriate design has
been increasingly the subject of global or regional initiatives owing to significant cross-border spillovers,
free-rider problems, or required restrictions on national policy autonomy.- 19 -
A. Monetary policies
The orthodox policy response to currency turmoil by monetary tightening and high interest rates
has not proved effective in recent financial crises.  When financial markets panic, the likely effects of
such a policy on capital flows tend to be perverse because of the strong adverse influence on credit risk.
The withdrawal of foreign lending and flight from the country begin in the first place because lenders
and investors do not expect to receive the return on their assets.  Higher interest rates simply signal
declining creditworthiness and rising default risk, and the expected rate of return adjusted for risk thus
tends to fall as interest rates are raised.  Even double-digit rates of interest may be unable to persuade
people to keep their capital in domestic assets when they believe that such rates are politically difficult
to maintain, as was seen in some European countries during the EMS crisis.
If persistently applied, monetary tightening can eventually stabilize the currency by intensifying
the difficulties of the debtors and increasing bankruptcies and defaults – that is, by reducing the sales
rather than by increasing the purchases of domestic currency.  As debt deflation and recession deepen,
debtors will become increasingly insolvent and unable to raise funds to purchase foreign exchange to
service their debt or to hedge against the exchange-rate risk.  However, stabilization of markets by
monetary tightening will often be a slow process and will eventually be achieved only by depressing the
economy and increasing defaults rather than by bringing back foreign capital.
B. Foreign-exchange reserves and lines of credit
It has been suggested that debtor countries should maintain adequate reserves to meet their short-
term obligations in order to avoid currency turmoil in the face of a massive withdrawal of foreign loans
and investment.  Proponents of such a policy point to the experience of economies with large reserves
such as Taiwan Province of China, arguing that large reserves would also deter speculative attacks on
the currency.  However, the consequences of accumulating reserves by borrowing are quite different
from accumulating them through trade surpluses.  One way of building up such reserves is to sterilize
capital inflows through the issue of domestic public debt.  However, there is a certain degree of
circularity in such a strategy.  In effect, it means that a country should borrow short only when it does
not use the proceeds of such loans to finance investment and imports.  Such a strategy can be very costly
to the economy since the return on foreign reserves generally falls short of the cost of external
borrowing.  Moreover, the cost of sterilizing private borrowing falls entirely on the public sector whose
losses will exceed the foreign exchange cost of carrying such reserves since domestic interest rates on- 20 -
24 For a more schematic account of the incidence of the cost of such borrowing see UNCTAD (1999b: chap. V, sect. C.2).
25 This possibility is raised in IMF (1999: 33).
26 See, for example, Group of 22 (1998b).
government debt exceed the rates earned on reserves by a larger margin than borrowing rates in
international financial markets.  This can give rise to large fiscal deficits.24
A variant of this proposal is for the public sector fully to cover the external short-term liabilities
of the private sector by borrowing at long-term and investing at short-term abroad.  However, not all
governments have access to long-term foreign borrowing.  More importantly, the cost of such an
operation can be very large, particularly when the international long-term rates exceed short-term rates
by a large margin and the risk premium on long-term sovereign debt is high.  Another strategy would
be to maintain credit lines with foreign private banks and to use them when faced with an attack, which
is tantamount to arranging a private lender-of-last-resort facility.  Again, however, this will work only
so long as too large a credit line is not sought.  Moreover, the costs involved can be substantial.  Finally,
there is no guarantee that funds will actually be available when there is a massive withdrawal of foreign
lending; and even if they are available, the funds provided may merely offset reduced access to normal
credits.25
A further problem is that vulnerability to withdrawal of funds is not confined to liabilities in the
form of short-term debt.  In this respect what matters is the liquidity rather than the maturity of liabilities.
As mentioned earlier, massive withdrawal of funds from the equity market can also cause difficulties in
the currency market, even though declines in the prices of such assets tend to alleviate pressures on the
exchange rate.  But the cost of maintaining reserves large enough to meet this eventuality could also be
very large.
C. Transparency, disclosure and early warning
The Asian financial crisis has accelerated initiatives to improve the timeliness and quality of
information concerning key macroeconomic variables as well as the financial reporting of banks and
non-financial firms.26  These are viewed as essential for better decision taking by private lenders and
investors, greater market discipline over policy-makers, more effective policy surveillance by multilateral
financial institutions, and strengthened financial regulation and supervision.
Regarding key macroeconomic variables, an initiative had already been taken after the Mexican
crisis when the IMF established the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) in April 1996 to guide
member countries in the public dissemination of economic and financial information in the context of
seeking or maintaining access to international financial markets.  At the time it was hoped that the new,
more stringent rules associated with the SDDS would serve as an early warning system that would help- 21 -
27 This code is to complement one of good practice on fiscal transparency aimed at strengthening the credibility and public
understanding of macroeconomic policies and choices regarding fiscal policies.  For a summary of the main features of the code
of good practices on transparency in monetary and financial policies and discussion of other current initiatives to strengthen the
international financial system, see Drage and Mann (1999: 44–45).
to prevent future financial crises.  However, in the event the rules did not make such a contribution in
the case of the East Asian crisis.  In April 1998 the Interim Committee proposed a broadening of the
SDDS, clearly inspired in part by what it considered to be the role of informational deficiencies in the
East Asian crisis, so that the system would also cover additional financial data such as net reserves (after
allowance for central banks liabilities under forward or derivative transactions), private debt (in
particular that at short maturities), and other indicators bearing on the stability of the financial sector.
At the same time the Interim Committee also asked the IMF to examine the desirability of a code of good
practice on transparency with respect to monetary and financial policies which was completed in July
1999 and was adopted in September 1999 by the Interim Committee.27  The code identifies practices
designed to enhance the transparency, accountability and integrity of the institutions or agencies
responsible for the conduct of monetary policy, for financial regulation and supervision, and for
oversight of payments systems.  Moreover initiatives are under way in the Committee on the Global
Financial System with the purpose of exploring ways of improving disclosure by the financial
intermediaries involved in international capital flows.
While such initiatives are useful, their impact is likely to be gradual since it will depend to a
substantial extent on their success in shaping standards and norms not only of official bodies but also
of financial firms, and changes in standards and norms, especially those related to private business
operations, frequently require considerable periods of time.  Moreover, the potential of such initiatives
for preventing financial crises should not be overemphasized.  Emphasis on inadequate information as
the major reason for failure to forecast the East Asian crisis, for example, appears exaggerated.  Although
there were some important gaps in information, data were generally available concerning key variables
in the countries concerned, such as their balance of payments, both their short- and longer-term external
debt and external assets (in particular in the periodic reports of the BIS concerning international bank
lending), their capital inflows, the exposure of banks and other financial firms to different sectors or
categories of economic activity, and the problems of the property sector.  What was missing was
adequate evaluation by both multilateral financial institutions and market participants of the implications
of available information for countries’ ability to continue to obtain funding from the international
financial markets.  A similar unwillingness to be influenced by available data was evident during the
Russian crisis.  Much of the increase in the external financial exposure to Russia took place during a
period when information was widely available concerning the shortcomings of Russian macroeconomic
policy, the weaknesses of the country’s banks, and the underdeveloped state of the country’s legal and
regulatory framework and of its system of corporate governance.  Moreover, most of the capital inflows
into Russia took place when the country was carrying out IMF stabilization programmes.- 22 -
28 The question may be asked, for example, whether disclosure during the spring of 1997 of the accumulation by the Central
Bank of Thailand of a large part of the forward-exchange liabilities that depleted its net foreign exchange reserves would have
fostered more orderly adjustment or simply have accelerated its currency crisis.
29 The improved private-sector transparency for which calls are being made is intended to include not only the reporting of
financial firms but also that of non-financial entities.  Many of the recommendations under this heading (such as those relating to
accounting standards and other disclosures required for shares listed on stock exchanges) refer to both.  Financial reporting by
several economic sectors is characterized by specificities absent elsewhere, but such specificities are especially important for the
financial sector and linked in many ways integrally to its regulation and supervision, the character of which reflects its central role
in economies’ functioning and stability.  In view of their key position in current reform initiatives, the discussion here is limited
to the transparency issues involving financial firms.
30 Even in the United States, whose banking sector is required to meet relatively high standards of disclosure and where there
are growing arguments for increased reliance on disclosure in vetting and disciplining banks, historically “the objective of the bank
regulatory agencies has been to preserve the soundness of individual institutions and the integrity of the banking system as a whole.
This objective influenced their approach in requiring compliance with disclosure requirements.  Generally, the agencies preferred
to allow institutions time to resolve financial difficulties.  This approach clearly is antithetical to the theory of a marketplace
governed by the intense glare of full disclosure” (Arista, 1998: 340).
31 See, for example, Caouette et al. (1998: 409).
The implicit assumption here appears to be that the deterioration in a debtor country’s external
payments, net external assets, the growth of domestic credit and so on, will trigger a gradual response
and adjustment in the behaviour of lenders and investors, thereby avoiding sudden breaks and panics.
But the reality is often that the initial deterioration has little or no effect.  Indeed, despite the existence
of data and information on such variables, currencies and financial asset prices continue to overshoot
their sustainable levels.  While the emergence of such misalignments is often a gradual process, spread
over a relatively long period of time, their correction is usually compressed into a very short period, and
is associated with overshooting in the other direction.  Indeed, once the rush to exit has begun, the
process itself will lead to a rapid worsening of key indicators and in these circumstances transparency
may simply accelerate it.28
The East Asian crisis has also focused attention on standards of accounting and financial
reporting, particularly those of financial firms.29  At first sight recommendations for greater transparency
on the part of financial firms have an almost self-evident quality, and the value of improvements in this
area seems incontrovertible.  Yet on closer scrutiny the issues become less simple.  The quality of
information made available to financial supervisors has an important bearing on the effectiveness of their
work.  However, there is less consensus as to the benefits of disclosure to market participants.  Public
disclosure of information submitted to supervisors is typically subject to limits resulting from belief that
it could undermine the confidence in the financial system that regulation is intended to promote,
complicate the task of banking supervisors in handling the problems of banks in difficulty,30 and enhance
rather than diminish the likelihood of increased volatility and instability confronted by financial firms
more generally (e.g. Caouette et al., 1998: 409).31  Indeed, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
itself has acknowledged that “there are certain types of information that should be held confidential by
banking supervisors” and that “the types of information considered sensitive vary from country to
country” (BCBs, 1997: 37).- 23 -
Despite the widespread acknowledgement of the problems which full disclosure by financial
firms may cause, there remains an important school of thought among financial regulators which
supports the idea that full disclosure’s favourable effects, through its strengthening of market discipline,
outweigh its costs.  Indeed, according to this view during periods of financial stress lack of information
about a bank’s exposures to credit and market risks can create a situation in which rumours restrict the
willingness of its creditors and counterparties to deal with it, thus threatening not only its survival but
possibly also that of other banks which, often also because of inadequate disclosure, appear similar to
outsiders (BIS, 1994: para. 2.4).
As in the case of macroeconomic information concerning debtor countries, an implicit
assumption of this argument would appear to be that disclosure would make possible the exercise of
market discipline in an orderly way which avoided herd-like or panic-stricken reactions on the part of
creditors and other counterparties.  Such a scenario will undoubtedly apply in some cases.  But the
outcome will depend on the reactions of different categories of counterparty, some of which have greater
access to direct information about a debtor than others, and on different national legal rules and norms.
Here too experience shows that there is a danger that initial indications of something amiss may have at
most a limited effect but once the climate of opinion among creditors changes, disclosure will simply
intensify the debtor’s difficulties, thus exacerbating the supervisory problems already mentioned (and
possibly posing a threat of broader financial destabilization).
Arguments for full disclosure also raise the question of the value of information made available
by financial firms for decisions by supervisors as well as by creditors and other counterparties.  Financial
liberalization and innovation have greatly increased the speed at which financial firms in many countries
can now alter the assets and liabilities on their balance sheets as well as their scope for taking off-balance
sheet positions of an opaque nature, thereby changing the risks they face in ways which can be difficult
for outsiders to identify.  For example, William McDonough, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York and current chairman of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, has made this point
in surprisingly strong terms:  “... formerly, you could look at the balance sheet of a financial institution
and quickly get a sense of exposure and risks.  Today balance-sheet information is clearly inadequate
for this purpose ... the fast pace of activity in today’s market renders financial statements stale almost
before they can be prepared” (Leach et al., 1993: 15–16).  These considerations are especially pertinent
to banks with substantial trading operations, an increasingly common feature of financial firms.
These limitations of accounting information would apply even if financial firms were fulfilling
the requirements of best practice in this area.  But in fact there is considerable variation even among
industrial countries in both the quantity and form of publicly disclosed information:  while arrangements
for its provision are widely being strengthened, they frequently fall well short of levels corresponding- 24 -
32 For recommendations as to best practice see BCBS (1998).
33 Ernest and Young (1993), which covers 17 industrial economies as well as Bahrain, Hong Kong (China), Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Africa and United Arab Emirates; and Price Waterhouse Survey of Bank Provisioning (1995), reproduced as
Appendix A of Beattie et al. (1995), which covers 14 industrial countries.  The period to which these surveys relate is 1992–1994.
34 In some countries there may also be divergence between the enunciated standards of the regime for accounting and financial
reporting and the actual practice of several financial firms.
35 See, for example, Krayenbuehl (1988: Parts Two and Three), and Caouette et al. (1998: chap. 22).
36 For brief surveys see Goldstein (1998), and Eichengreen and Rose (1998/99).
to what is now considered to be best practice.32  The point emerges from  recent surveys of regimes for
financial reporting and the regulatory  treatment of loan losses.33  The information in these surveys, some
of which is summarized in table 3, is not necessarily fully up-to-date, but although the divergence
between accepted best practice and national legal regimes may have narrowed since they were
undertaken, in many areas it is still likely to be substantial.34  Moreover, with regard to the topical subject
of banks’ trading and derivatives activities the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO
have concluded on a series of surveys of the annual reports of a selection of major banks and securities
firms that “Despite ... improvements, there remain significant disparities ... as regards the type and
usefulness of the information disclosed ... some institutions continue to disclose little, generally, about
key aspects of their trading and derivatives activities” (BCBS and IOSCO, 1998: para. 18).
The potential value of the information associated with fuller disclosure for improved surveillance
has been a stimulus to econometric analysis of the determinants of currency and banking crises.  One
of the objectives of this work is the development of leading indicators.  Analyses of country risk have
long been standard features of the operations of firms and other institutions involved in cross-border
lending and investment.35  The new econometric work on currency crises represents an attempt to
identify more systematically relations between, and the relative importance of, variables traditionally
included in analyses of country risk (but often evaluated more informally, for example, on the basis of
scoring systems).  Work so far36 has served to clarify certain issues in international discussion of
financial crises but seems more likely to supplement (or serve as an additional input to) pre-existing
methods of analysing country risk which, owing to their operational role, must often rely on preliminary,
tentative estimates of key variables and inevitably incorporate qualitative evaluation that is specific to
particular cases but has an important bearing on the likely actual outbreak of crises.  The contribution
of econometric work on banking crises can be expected to be similar:  here too the discussion of certain
issues can be clarified but it is difficult to foresee a situation where such work replaces first-hand (and
sometimes confidential) information about the financial sector available to supervisors (and in some
cases also to financial firms), and the rapidly proliferating techniques used by both to analyse different







































































































































































































































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes I.
II. Accounting standards fixed by law No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes II.
III. Exemptions from disclosure obligations for banks Yes Yes .. Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes
c
No No No No No Yes Yes No No No No No III.
IV.
Direct communication between auditors and 
supervisors in prescribed circumstances Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No IV.
V. Segmental reporting required Yes No .. Yes Yes Yes No No
d
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No .. Yes Yes V.
VI. Criteria for establishment of specific loan loss provisions MD .. .. MD OR MD MD
e




MD MD .. .. .. .. OR MD .. MD OR
h
VI.
VII. Criteria for establishment of general loan loss provisions MD .. .. MD OR OR MD MD .. .. MD OR MD OR .. .. .. .. MD MD .. MD OR
h
VII.
VIII. Levels of specific loan loss provisions MD .. .. MD MD MD MD
i
MD .. .. MD OR MD MD .. .. .. .. OR MD .. MD MD
h
VIII.





















X. Valuation of collateral MD .. .. MD MD MD MD MD .. .. MD MD
m
MD MD .. .. .. .. OR MD .. MD OR X.
Sources: 
I, II, III, IV and V: Ernst & Young, International Bank Accounting , 3rd edition (London: Euromoney Publications, 1993); VI, VII, VIII, IX and X: Price Waterhouse Survey of Bank Provisioning, reproduced as appendix A of
 V. A. Beattie, P.D. Casson, R.S. Dale, G.W. McKenzie, C.M.S. Sutcliffe and M.J. Turner, Banks and Bad Debts: Accounting for Loan Losses in International Banking (Chichester: John Wiley, 1995).
a 1992:  23 economies (17 industrial, 6 developing); 1994: 14 industrial economies.
b Subject to exemptions for non-banking subsidiaries.
c Reflecting flexibility regarding presentation of accounts.
d Some breakdown of assets and liabilities required.
e Subject to some guidelines of the French Banking Commission.
f Subject to general regulatory guidance.
g Subject to approval of Ministry of Finance.
h Without distinction between specific and general loan loss provisions.
i Subject to official guidance as to minimum levels for different categories of loan.
j For country risk.
k Including rules for hidden reserves. 
l Including rules set by tax authorities.




Features of financial reporting and supervision for banks in selected economies, 1992
a  and 1994
a
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37 A harsh assessment of efforts to develop early-warning indicators of currency and banking crises has been made by a recent
visiting scholar at the IMF as follows:  “[Concerns over the adverse impact of financial crises on financial liberalization] have
encouraged the official community to invest in early-warning indicators of currency and banking crises in the hope that they will
see what is coming.  Unfortunately, these models will have about as much success in predicting financial crises as geologists’
models have in predicting earthquakes.  Earthquakes and financial crises are products of complex nonlinear systems, whose parts
interact in unpredictable ways.  Consider the following entirely realistic example.  The government will devalue the currency only
if it fears that the interest rate increases required to defend it will irreparably damage a weak banking system.  But the banking
system will weaken to this point only if investors withdraw their deposits from the country because they anticipate a devaluation
....  Whether speculators attack depends not only on the weakness of a country’s banking system but on how much a government
cares about further aggravating this problem when deciding whether to defend the currency.  And the only thing more difficult to
measure than a government’s resolve is investors’ assessment of it.”  See Eichengreen (1999: 13).
financial firms’ and supervisors’ techniques for identifying financial risks, are capable of improving
policies towards financial crises, there are limits to their effectiveness partly owing to shortcomings of
the methods involved and of the information on which they depend,37 and also because of limitations
of financial regulation and supervision (to which analysis of financial risk is closely connected).
D. Financial regulation and supervision
Weak credit evaluation and speculative lending, as well as failure to control currency risk among
banks and other financial firms, are often at the origin of financial and currency crises, particularly in
emerging markets.  There is thus general agreement that regulatory reform is an essential part of the
strengthening and restructuring of the financial sector.  However, such reform is not a fail-safe way of
preventing financial crises, though it can reduce their likelihood and help to contain their effects.
In recent years there has been widespread reform and strengthening of financial regulation at the
national level, accompanied by a proliferation of international initiatives to raise regulatory standards and
to improve cooperation among supervisors.  These processes have been largely driven by concerns
raised in relation to financial liberalization and global financial integration.  On the one hand, the
diversification of their services and the increased competition that are associated with liberalization have
exposed financial firms to new levels of risk, which have necessitated overhaul of financial regulation.
On the other hand, global financial integration has brought in its train much greater exposure among
countries to each other’s financial and macroeconomic conditions and increased possibilities for the
cross-border transmission of destabilizing influences, while also exposing weaknesses in banking
regulation and in cross-border cooperation among banking supervisors.
The main vehicles for international initiatives in financial regulation and supervision have been
the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and other bodies with close links to the BIS as well as
other groups concerned with regulatory and accounting standards mentioned above.  The initiatives of
the Basle Committee have included the adoption of principles designed to ensure that no international
bank escapes adequate supervision and the prescription of levels of capital commensurate with the risks
that banks run.  Agreements under the latter heading were reached concerning credit risks in 1988 (the- 27 -
38 Credit risk results from the possibility that a bank’s counterparty will default on its obligations, and market risk is that of
loss due to changes in the market value of a bank’s asset before it can be liquidated or offset in some way.
Basle Capital Accord) and market risks in 199638.  More recently the Basle Committee has enunciated
standards for supervisory practice in its statement, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision,
the drafting of which involved cooperation with the supervisory authorities of a number of key emerging
markets as well as the IMF and the World Bank (BCBS, 1997).  The coverage of these Principles includes
licensing, various aspects of bank structure, prudential regulation, the methods and powers of
supervisors, information requirements, and issues related to cross-border banking.  A Core Principles
Liaison Group has been established to monitor the implementation and further development of the
Principles.  In time the Principles can be expected to lead to considerable improvements in regimes of
regulation and supervision.  But there will still be limits to their effectiveness in preventing financial
instability and crises owing partly to almost inevitable imperfections in implementation but also to
inherent features of financial regulation (which are discussed at greater length below). 
1. The reform of the Basle Capital Accord
Developments in the past few years have shown that the standards of the Basle Capital Accord
are increasingly divorced from the credit risks actually faced by many banks, and are distorting
incentives for banks regarding the capital maintained for a given level of risk.  In the context of
preventing and managing financial crisis, there is widespread agreement that better control over
international inter-bank lending in source countries could contribute to greater global financial stability.
However, while the short-term exposure of international banks has been a major feature of recent
external debt crises, the Basle Capital Accord attributes a low (20-per-cent) risk weight for the purpose
of calculation of capital requirements to claims on banks outside the OECD area with a residual maturity
of up to one year and all claims on banks incorporated in the OECD area.  This has led to pressure for
regulatory changes which would have the consequence of raising the cost to banks of such lending so
that they better reflect its risks.  Again there are problems due to inappropriate calibration under the
Accord of the credit risks of loans to different private borrowers: the same capital charge, for example,
is assessed against a loan to a company with an investment-grade rating as to a company with a junk-
bond one, thereby providing incentives for so-called “regulatory capital arbitrage”.
Such concerns underlie the new initiative of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision to
reform the Accord (BCBS, 1999).  The approach now envisaged rests on “three pillars”:  minimum
capital requirements, supervisory review of capital adequacy in accordance with specified qualitative
principles, and market discipline based on the provision of reliable and timely information.  The new
proposed capital rules include provision for risk weights for exposure to sovereign entities based on
external assessment by rating agencies meeting certain criteria (subject to the country’s acceptance of the- 28 -
39 The recently proposed Financial Stability Forum consisting of representatives from the finance ministries, central banks and
senior regulatory authorities of the G-7 countries as well as from the IMF, the World Bank, the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision, IOSCO, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the Bank for International Settlements, the
OECD, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, and the Committee on the Global Financial System (formerly the
Euro-Currency Standing Committee) is arguably of this kind.  Objectives include pooling and sharing of information on
vulnerability in the international financial system among different bodies, and some kind of monitoring of the implementation of
internationally agreed regulatory and supervisory standards and codes of conduct.
standards regarding disclosure of the IMF’s SDDS) and two possible approaches to weights for interbank
exposures, one linking them to the sovereign risk for the country where the bank is incorporated and the
other based directly on external ratings of banks themselves.  Under the second approach short-term
interbank claims might still receive more favourable treatment than those with longer maturities but either
approach would be likely to lead to widespread increases in the capital requirements for interbank
lending for entities other than those located in countries with the highest credit ratings or in receipt of
such ratings themselves.
2. A World Financial Authority
The increasingly global character of financial markets and growing links between different
categories of financial business have given rise to proposals for the creation of a global mega-agency for
financial regulation and supervision or World Financial Authority (WFA).  These proposals would
appear to be motivated by two arguments.  On one argument, since financial businesses are becoming
increasingly interrelated and cross-border, their regulation and supervision should also be carried out
on a unified and global basis.  The other argument focuses on the stability of capital movements under
the present patchwork of regimes which only more globally uniform regulation could be expected to
control.  Various models for a WFA can be envisaged, spanning the spectrum from an institution built
on (and thus involved a limited departure from) existing arrangements to one with more comprehensive
responsibilities.  The more ambitious variant would involve a body with responsibility for setting
regulatory standards for all financial enterprises, off-shore as well as on-shore entities (Eatwell and
Taylor, 1998a, 1998b).  National regulators would remain responsible for implementing standards
promulgated by such a WFA, but the new institution could contribute to ensuring their observance
through its surveillance since unfavourable public assessments issued by it could be expected to act as
a brake on a country’s capital inflows.  A less ambitious variant for the WFA might serve simply as an
umbrella organization into which existing bodies (in some cases with appropriately expanded mandates)
would be brought.39
While there is considerable scope for strengthening both national regulatory regimes, eliminating
their several, often glaring lacunae, and improving cooperation between national supervisors, it is not
clear that the more ambitious variant would be a better instrument for this purpose than improvements
in the functioning of institutions and modalities already in existence.  Such a WFA would have to- 29 -
confront the problem of reconciling and integrating the different legal and conceptual frameworks under
which supervisors from different backgrounds work.  Furthermore, there are no compelling reasons to
believe that such a WFA would be more successful than the IMF in achieving stability in financial
markets.  The legal instruments on the basis of which the WFA would operate would have to be
reconciled with the powers of existing institutions, notably the IMF.  There is also the matter of how
power would be exercised in the new institution and by whom.  It is not realistic to envisage that a global
institution like a WFA with genuine clout could be established on the basis of a distribution of power
markedly different from that of existing multilateral financial institutions.  The alternative to a WFA is
not an institutional tabula rasa.  An, albeit imperfect, network of institutions is already in place, and
there can be potential benefits from strengthening it, extending its mandate in certain areas and
supplementing it gradually as greater participation is assured and its governance improved.
3. The limits of prudential regulation
The continuing incidence of financial instability and crises in industrial countries suggests that
regulatory and supervisory reform is unlikely to provide fail-safe protection in this area.  And if this
statement is true even of countries with state-of-the-art financial regulation and supervision, it is likely
to apply a fortiori to most developing and transition economies.  These limits to the effectiveness of
regulation and supervision have various sources.  Firstly, financial regulation is constantly struggling to
keep up with financial innovation, and in this struggle it is not always successful.  There is thus a
continuing danger that new practices or transactions not yet adequately covered by the regulatory
framework may prove a source of financial instability.  Closely related in many ways to financial
innovation are growing difficulties regarding the transparency required for regulation and supervision.
As described above, the balance sheets and other returns of many financial firms have an increasingly
chameleon-like quality which reduces their value to regulators.  The tensions between financial
innovation and effective regulation in modern financial markets are unlikely to disappear:  one can
envisage a tightening of regulation sufficiently drastic to come close to eliminating the dangers due to
innovation, but the tightening would probably be too stifling of such innovation to be politically
acceptable in any country valuing dynamism in its financial sector.
But perhaps the most fundamental determinant of the limits of regulation and supervision is the
susceptibility of most of banks’ assets to changes in their quality resulting from changes in economic
conditions. No private-sector loan or other asset on a bank’s balance sheet should be classified
generically as “good”.  However reasonable the original managerial decision to make a loan and however
justified its initial classification as low-risk by banking supervisors, the loan is vulnerable to the- 30 -
40 See UNCTAD (1998a:  Part One, chap. IV, sect. C.3).
41 See, for example, BCBS (1991: sect. IV).
possibility of an eventual deterioration in its status.40  So long as cycles of financial boom and bust are
features of the economic system, so also will be unforeseeable deteriorations in the status of many bank
assets.  During such cycles risks take time to build up and become widely evident.  For a while, indeed,
the quality of loans can actually be enhanced by the very financing boom of which they are a part.
Eventually, the effects of excess capacity generated by the boom and of the over-extended position of
financial firms are likely to combine with the factors described in section B to transform the boom into
a movement in the opposite direction.
Consequences of such boom-bust cycles can be described in terms of the concept, “latent
concentration risk”, as used in recent literature on credit risk (Caouette, 1998: 91, 240).  Concentration
risk is traditionally handled in the context of banking regulation and supervision through limits on the
size of exposures to particular borrowers.  For this purpose “borrower” is typically defined to include
groups of counterparties characterized by links due to common ownership, common directors, cross-
guarantees, or forms of short-term commercial interdependency.41  But boom-bust cycles bring into
focus risks due to latent concentration as they lead to deterioration in the economic positions of
counterparties apparently unconnected in other, more normal times.  Indeed, a common feature of the
boom-bust cycle would appear to be exacerbation of the risk of latent concentration as lenders move into
an area or sector en masse prior to attempts to exit similarly.
To some extent the risks of latent concentration can be handled through banks’ loan-loss
provisions and through higher prudential capital requirements for credit risk.  But the financing
associated with booms in the value of property and other assets are difficult for supervisors to restrain
with the measures at their disposal owing to the size of increases in expected income growth or capital
gains which are frequently involved.  The limits on the crisis-preventing potential of financial regulation
are generally recognized by specialists in the field, so that its primary objectives are regarded as having
more to do with reducing financial firms’ liquidity and solvency problems, protecting depositors, and
preventing or mitigating systemic risks due to contagion.
E. Policy surveillance
In view of the growing size and integration of financial markets, every major financial crisis now
has global ramifications.  Consequently, preventing a crisis is a concern not only for the country
immediately affected but also for other countries.  Since macroeconomic and financial policies have a
major role in the build-up of financial fragility and emergence of financial crises, global surveillance of- 31 -
42 Econometric research suggests that internal and external factors were about equally important in the surge in capital flows
to Latin America during the early 1990s (Calvo, 1994).
national policies is called for, with a view to ensuring greater stability and sustainability of exchange rates
and external payments positions.
The IMF conducts bilateral surveillance of individual countries’ policies through annual Article
IV consultations and multilateral surveillance through periodic reviews of global economic conditions
in the context of the World Economic Outlook.  The failure of IMF surveillance in preventing
international financial crises reflects, in part, belated, and so far only partial, adaptation of existing
procedures to the problems posed by the large autonomous private capital flows.  But perhaps more
fundamentally it is due to the unbalanced nature of these procedures, which give too little recognition
to the disproportionately large global impact of monetary policies in major industrial countries.
International financial crises are often connected with major shifts in macroeconomic indicators external
to the countries where the crises first manifest themselves.  For example, the origins of the debt crises
of the 1980s are to be found in the inconsistencies in policy mix and stances of major OECD countries
which resulted in a sharp rise in interest rates in the United States and the appreciation of the dollar.
Likewise both the surge in capital inflows and the subsequent outflows associated with the East Asian
crisis were strongly influenced by swings in exchange rates and monetary conditions in the United States
and other major OECD countries; and shifts in monetary conditions in the United States have played a
large role in the fluctuations in private external financing for Latin American countries.42
Even though the IMF surveillance, as formally defined, is limited to exchange-rate policies, its
scope has tended to broaden over time, so that it now encompasses “all the policies that affect trade,
capital movements, external adjustment, and the effective functioning of the international monetary
system” (Group of Ten, 1985: para. 40).  Given the degree of global interdependence, a stable system
of exchange rates and payments positions calls for a minimum degree of coherence among the
macroeconomic policies of major industrial countries subject to the proviso that this quest should not
lead to a deflationary bias in policies, since, as stated by IMF Article IV, the ultimate objective of policy
is to foster “orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability”.  The existing modalities of IMF
surveillance do not include ways of attaining such coherence or dealing with unidirectional impulses
resulting from changes in the monetary and exchange-rate policies of the United States and other major
OECD countries.  In the absence of incentives and enforcement procedures linked to the process of peer
review under IMF surveillance, countries elsewhere in the world economy lack mechanisms under the
existing system of global economic governance for redress or dispute settlement regarding these
impulses.  In this respect governance in macroeconomic and financial policies lags behind that for
international trade, where such mechanisms are part of the WTO regime.  Nor does the Group of 7
provide an effective forum for policy surveillance.  Not only does it exclude developing countries but
often it also fails to promote policy co-ordination so as to attain exchange-rate stability and growth within- 32 -
43 Interim Committee Communiqué of 16 April 1998.
44 IMF Executive Board Decision No. 10950-(95/37) of 10 April 1995 (amending Decision No. 5392-[77/63] of 29 April 1977).
the industrial world.  Broader ad hoc groupings that include emerging markets, such as the Group of 22,
cannot be expected to do much better here.  Multilateral financial institutions remain the only legitimate
and appropriate fora for securing policy consistency and coherence among major industrial countries
with a view to their effects on global growth and stability.  But if such a function is to be preformed
effectively, it is necessary to reform not only surveillance but also the governance of these institutions.
The need for strengthening IMF surveillance in response to conditions produced by greater
global financial integration and recurrent crises has been recognized by the Interim Committee in April
1998 which agreed that the Fund “should intensify its surveillance of financial sector issues and capital
flows, giving particular attention to policy interdependence and risks of contagion, and ensure that it is
fully aware of market views and perspectives”.43  However, despite the reference to interdependence,
it is not evident that these proposals extend to weaknesses arising from the lack of balance in existing
procedures.  Moreover, even within the current limits of surveillance, the IMF does not have a
satisfactory record of diagnosis of build-up of financial fragility and external vulnerability.  An important
reason is that bilateral surveillance has concentrated on macroeconomic policies, paying little attention
to sustainability of private capital inflows and financial sector weaknesses associated with surges in such
inflows, in large part because of the faith in financial liberalization and the infallibility of market forces.
After the Mexican crisis, the list of developments that may trigger discussions between the Fund and a
member country under IMF surveillance of exchange rate policies was extended to include
“unsustainable flows of private capital”,44 but this did not prevent the East Asian crisis.  Recent efforts
to develop early-warning indicators of banking and currency crises, work to which the IMF has
contributed, do not promise radical improvements in the capability of forecasting their outbreak for the
reasons given above in section D.3(c).
In future surveillance will need to pay greater attention to unsustainable exchange-rate and
payments developments caused by capital inflows, and the Fund’s recommendations should include,
where needed, control over such inflows.  This is quite consistent with the original IMF mandate on
surveillance over exchange rate policies, and it is in this context that IMF could be given a mandate over
exchange rate policies.  Given the difficulties in identifying factors likely to cause financial crises, it may
indeed be more prudent to place greater reliance as a matter of course on capital controls and other
measures at the national level directed at external assets and liabilities.  The effectiveness of IMF
surveillance will also depend on the reform of the Fund and its governance structures.  Such reform
must ensure transparency, accountability and participation.
Certainly there are difficulties in attaining full transparency in surveillance since governments
may find objectionable the disclosure of confidential information they provide to the Fund; and owing- 33 -
45 For instance, some of the conditions imposed by the Fund as part of its rescue package for the Republic of Korea have
been regarded as interfering “unnecessarily with the proper jurisdiction of sovereign government” (Feldstein, 1998: 26).
to questions regarding its track record in macroeconomic and financial diagnosis as well as to the
political sensitivities involved temptations to turn the Fund into a fully-fledged credit rating agency
should also be resisted.  Within these limits, however, there is scope to improve the transparency of the
IMF.  Its prescriptions could be subjected to independent review and the proposal that the United Nations
should constitute an IMF External Review Commission is worth pursuing (Sachs, 1998b: 17).  Moreover,
any extension of the Fund’s surveillance should be accompanied by a reform of its voting structure and
decision-making procedures to bring about greater participation by developing countries.  Quotas, which
to a great extent determine voting power and membership rights, need to be revised so that they reflect
more accurately relative economic and political power.  Different voting structures might also be
introduced for different types of decisions.  One suggestion is to distinguish between general policy
decisions (such as SDR allocations and quotas) and operational decisions related to country programmes,
and applying a more democratic voting system to the latter, while maintaining the quota-based system
for the former (Woods, 1998: 98, 102).  Alternatively, general policy decisions could be transferred to
the Interim Committee on a quota-based voting system, while the Executive Board could deal with
specific operational decisions through procedures providing for greater participation by its members.
F. An international lender of last resort
As already noted, currency crises in emerging markets develop as self-fulfilling debt runs,
leading to overshooting of exchange rates and translating liquidity into insolvency crises.  In view of
ineffectiveness of monetary policy in reversing such attacks and the probable inadequacy of reserves and
credit lines to meet the resulting demand for foreign currency, there have been calls to establish an
international lender-of-last-resort facility in order to provide international liquidity to countries facing
financial panic and to support their currencies.
Provision of liquidity to pre-empt large currency swings has not been the international policy
response to currency crises in developing countries.  Rather assistance coordinated by the IMF has
usually come after the collapse of the currency, in the form of bailout operations designed to meet the
demands of creditors, to maintain capital-account convertibility, and to prevent default.  Moreover,
availability of such financing has been associated with policy conditionality that went at times beyond
macroeconomic adjustment.45  Such bailout operations pose a number of problems.  First, they protect
creditors from bearing full costs of poor lending decisions, thereby putting the burden entirely on
debtors.  Moreover, they create moral hazard for international lenders and investors, encouraging
imprudent lending practices.  Finally, they require increasingly large amounts of financing that have been
difficult to raise.  These problems could not be evaded in the creation of a genuine international lender- 34 -
46 For a more optimistic appraisal of the IMF’s potential here see Fischer (1999).
47 This idea actually goes back to the Committee of Twenty.  It was revived by the IMF in 1994 and elaborated in a paper by
the management (IMF, 1994).  For discussions of the issues raised therein see Fitzgerald (1996) and Williamson (1995).
48 A suggestion along these lines was made by the Managing Director of the IMF to the Copenhagen Social Summit in March
1995, when he stated that an effective response to financial crises such as the Mexican one depended on “convincing our members
to maintain, at the IMF level, the appropriate level of resources to be able to stem similar crises if they were to occur”, adding that
this should lead to a decision in favour of “further work on the role the SDR could play in putting in place a last resort financial
safety net for the world” (IMF Survey, 20 March 1995).
49 See Ezekiel (1998); United Nations (1999); and Ahluwalia (1999).
of last resort.  The effective functioning of such a lender depends on two conditions:  it should have the
discretion to create its own liquidity (or to have unconstrained access to international liquidity), and there
should be reasonably well defined rules and conditions that the borrower must meet.  
Strictly speaking, the IMF does not satisfy either of the above conditions to qualify as a lender
of last resort.46  Nonetheless, on the eve of the Mexican crisis the IMF explored the possibility of creating
a new “short-term financing facility” (STFF) for this purpose, to be used by countries with close
integration with international capital markets, including industrial countries and emerging markets.
Although it was not put into practice, discussions concerning the scheme pointed to various problems
involved (which were subsequently highlighted during the bailout operations in response to the Mexican
and East Asian crises):  of special importance in this context were the sheer scale of the financing
required (although it was not envisaged that the facility would fully offset financial shocks) and the
difficulty of deciding on the terms on which money would be made available.47
The SDR might play a key role in the creation of a lender-of-last-resort facility as part of a
process of making it a true fiduciary asset and enhancing its role in global reserves.48  Recently proposals
have been made to allow the Fund to issue reversible SDRs to itself for use in lender-of-last-resort
operations, that is to say the allocated SDRs would be repurchased when the crisis was over.49  But either
approach would probably require an amendment of the Articles of Agreement and could face opposition
from some major industrial countries.  Even if one were to agree that the IMF could act as an
international lender of last resort but without such a capability to create its own liquidity, the Fund would
still require access to adequate resources.  Since there is agreement that the IMF should remain largely
a quota-based institution, funding through bond issues is ruled out.  This leaves the Fund’s own
resources and borrowing facilities (both the GAB and the NAB) as the only potential sources of funding.
However, they alone could not provide financing on the scale made available by the IMF and other
sources during the Mexican and East Asian crises.  On the other hand, even if mechanisms could be put
in place to allow the IMF to have rapid access to bilateral funds at times of crisis, it is highly questionable
whether the Fund could really act as an impartial lender of last resort in accordance with rules analogous
to such operations by national central banks since its decisions and resources would depend on the- 35 -
consent of its major shareholders who are typically creditors of those countries experiencing external
financial difficulties.
The terms of access to such a facility pose additional problems.  The conditions of lender-of-last-
resort financing, namely lending in unlimited amounts and without conditions except for penalty rates,
would require much tightened global supervision over borrowers to ensure their solvency, an unlikely
development.  While automatic access would ensure a timely response to market pressures, it would also
create moral hazard for international borrowers and lenders and considerable risk for the IMF.  By
contrast, conditional withdrawal of financial support would reduce the risk of moral hazard, but
negotiations could cause long delays, perhaps leading to deepening of the crisis.  It could also lead to
irrational and unnecessarily tough conditionality since the countries facing attacks on their currencies
would be too weak to resist such conditions.
One way of avoiding these problems might be through pre-qualification:  countries meeting
certain ex ante conditions would be eligible for lender-of-last-resort financing, with eligibility being
determined during Article IV consultations.  Access to the lender-of-last-resort facility on a pre-
qualification basis could be subject to limits (for example, as a multiple of country quotas) but, after a
crisis occurred, the country might have access to additional funds subject to its commitment to undertake
certain actions.  However, pre-qualification involves its own set of problems.  First, IMF would have
to act like a credit-rating agency.  Second, the result could be a further segmentation of the Fund’s
membership, with attendant consequences for its governance.  Third, lending at penalty rates might not
be enough to avoid moral hazard.  Finally, it would be necessary constantly to monitor the fulfilment of
the terms of the financing, adjusting them as necessary in response to changes in conditions (which might
include those in financial markets or others beyond the control of the government of the recipient
country).  In these respects difficulties may emerge in relations between the Fund and the member
concerned.  Such problems are exemplified by the recent Brazilian agreement with the IMF.  The
Brazilian package might be described as an experiment with the provision of international lender-of-last-
resort financing to an emerging market:  it was intended to protect the economy against contagion from
East Asia, subject to a stringent fiscal adjustment and a gradual depreciation of the real throughout 1999.
After a political struggle the Brazilian Government succeeded in passing the legislation needed to meet
the fiscal target but, when the currency came under attack, the Fund allowed the agreement to collapse,
requiring additional and more stringent conditions regarding the fiscal balance in order to release the
second tranche of the package.
The IMF has recently taken steps to strengthen its capacity to provide financing in crises, though
this capacity still facts short of that of a genuine international lender of last resort and the terms
associated with the new financing are likely to be subject to shortcomings discussed above.  The
Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) approved by the IMF’s Executive Board in response to the
deepening of the East Asian crisis in December 1997 (and already used in some cases such as that of- 36 -
50 See IMF Survey, 12 January 1998: 7.
51 IMF Press Release No. 99/14, 25 April 1999.
Brazil), provides financing without limit to countries experiencing exceptional payments difficulties but
under a highly conditional stand-by or Extended Arrangement.50  However, the SRF depends on the
existing resources of the Fund which, recent experience suggests, are likely to be inadequate on their own
to meet the costs of bailouts.  The creation of the Contingency Credit Line (CCL) in April is intended to
provide a precautionary line of defence in the form of short-term financing which would be available
to meet balance-of-payments problems arising from international financial contagion.51  The pressures
on the capital account and international reserves of a qualifying country must result from a sudden loss
of confidence amongst investors triggered largely by external factors.  The terms of the CCL involve
elements of pre-qualification as described above:  the availability of funds is subject to the country’s
compliance with conditions related to macroeconomic and external financial indicators and with
international standards in areas such as transparency, banking supervision and the quality of its relations
and financing arrangements with the private sector.  The hope is that the precautionary nature of the CCL
will restrict the level of actual drawings, but the danger is that countries will avoid recourse to it, even
in the circumstances for which it is intended, owing to fears that it will have the effect of a tocsin in
international financial markets, thus stifling access to credit.  Moreover, although no limits on the scale
of available funds are specified, like the SRF, the CCL will depend on the existing resources of the Fund.
Perhaps a more critical issue is that establishing a genuine international lender of last resort
would imply a fundamental departure from the underlying premises of the Bretton Woods system which
provided for the use of capital controls to deal with capital flows.  In discussion of such a facility its
introduction is frequently linked to concomitant arrangements regarding rights and obligations with
respect to international capital transactions together with a basic commitment to capital-account
liberalization.  Even if a properly functioning international lender of last resort could be put in place, it
is not clear that this would be the right course of action in response to financial crises and the problems
they cause for developing countries.
G. Orderly debt workouts
Commenting on the debt crisis of the 1980s more than a decade ago, UNCTAD pointed to the
circumstance that debtor countries often had to face at and the same time “the financial and economic
stigma of being judged de facto bankrupt, with all the consequences that this entails as regards
creditworthiness and future access to financing, [while also largely lacking] the benefits of receiving the- 37 -
52 See UNCTAD (1986: annex to chap. VI).  The need for orderly workouts for cross-border claims has subsequently been
recognized by many observers, including Sachs (1995), Sachs (1998a), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Group of 22 (1998a), and
Eichengreen (1999).  For a recent survey of the issues involved see Radelet (1999).
53 For a comparison between the United States, the United Kingdom and German bankruptcy codes see Eichengreen and
Portes (1995), and Franks (1995).
54 Even in individual cases, the application of such provisions involves a number of complex legal questions, such as the
determination of the relevant law and forum, and enforcement.  See, for example, Sassoon and Bradlow (1987).
financial relief and financial reorganization that would accompany a de jure bankruptcy handled in a
manner similar to chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code”.52
Chapter 11 procedures are especially relevant to international debt crises resulting from liquidity
problems because they are designed primarily to address financial restructuring rather than liquidation.
They are based on the premise that the value of the firm as a going concern exceeds the value of its assets
in the event of liquidation.  Debtors are usually left in possession of their property, and the aim of the
procedures is to facilitate orderly workouts in three stages.  At the outset procedures allow for an
automatic standstill on debt servicing in order to provide the debtors-in-possession with a breathing
space from their creditors.  The automatic-stay provision is based on the recognition that a “grab race”
for assets by the creditors is detrimental to the debtor as well as to the creditors as a group.  It allows the
debtor the opportunity to formulate a reorganization plan and ensures that creditors are treated equally.
Secondly, the Code provides the debtor with access to working capital needed to carry out its operations.
A seniority status is granted to debt contracted after the filing of the petition.  The final stage is the
reorganization of assets and liabilities of the debtor and its operations.  The Code discourages holdouts
by a certain class of creditors and accelerates the process towards a rapid resolution.  The plan does not
require unanimous support by the creditors, and the debtor can obtain court approval of the
reorganization plans under the “cramdown” provisions.  For solvent but illiquid firms, automatic stay
and access to new financing may need to be supplemented with an extension of debt maturities.
Insolvent firms, on the other hand, would require debt write-downs and conversions, financial and
managerial reorganization, and where solvency cannot be restored through such means, liquidation.
These procedures are used not only for private debt.  Chapter 9 of the Code deals with public debtors
(municipalities) and applies the same principles.  Similar arrangements exist in most other industrial
countries.53
Naturally, the application of such principles to cross-border debt involves a number of complex
issues.  What is under consideration here is not the resolution of individual cases of cross-border claims,
but systemic illiquidity problems associated with a generalized rush to exits and run on the currency.
Individual debtors may enjoy insolvency protection subject to provisions in their contracts with the
creditors, including collective action clauses in bond contracts designed to allow changes in the payment
terms.54  However, while helpful, under generalized debt runs such provisions do not offer much relief
to the country concerned, even if the bulk of the external debt is owed by private banks and firms.- 38 -
When there are numerous debtors, it is very difficult to activate appropriate procedures simultaneously
for all so as to halt the run on the currency.  More importantly, as in East Asia, most private debtors may
indeed be solvent, but the country may not have the reserves to meet the demand for foreign exchange.
However, as noted above, debt runs can make such debtors insolvent, and this danger is greater when
external debt is owed by the private sector and exchange controls have been dismantled.  Thus the task
of stemming runs on the currency falls on the governments of debtor countries.
Current judicial practices and government policies in the major industrial countries do not allow
debtor governments to benefit from standstill provisions regarding their external debt.  In this context,
a question arises as to whether the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF can provide a
statutory basis for action by debtor governments through exchange controls.  The most relevant
provisions are in article VIII, section 2(b):  “Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any
member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or
imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member.  In
addition, members may, by mutual accord, cooperate in measures for the purpose of making the
exchange control regulations of either member more effective, provided that such measures and
regulations are consistent with this Agreement”.  This Article has given rise to a number of conflicting
interpretations as to the latitude it provides for governments to impose standstills on payment of external
obligations.  In practice governments are reluctant to resort to unilateral suspension of debt servicing and
exchange controls even in the extreme event of financial panic since, as recognized by the IMF, “there
exists no well-defined and accepted legal process that is applicable in such cases”, so that “the process
of debt resolution by involuntary restructuring is necessarily ad hoc with uncertain outcome” and
“involuntary debt restructuring will damage creditworthiness and may increase the cost of accessing
international markets in the future” (IMF, 1995: 11).
In view of the deficiencies of current institutional arrangements for dealing with debt crises, and
the increased capacity of financial markets to inflict serious damage, there is now a growing recognition
of the need for reform.  One proposal is to create an international bankruptcy court in order to apply an
international version of chapter 11 (or chapter 9) drawn up in the form of an international treaty ratified
by all members of the United Nations (Raffer, 1990).  A less ambitious and perhaps more feasible option
would be to establish a framework for the application to international debtors of key insolvency
principles, namely debt standstill and debtor-in-possession financing, and to combine them with the
established practices for restructuring debt.
On one view, under such a framework standstills would need to be sanctioned by the IMF:
“upon determination by the Executive Board of the IMF, the debtor government would be protected from
legal challenges by its creditors for immediate debt collection” (Sachs, 1988a: 52).  It has in fact been
suggested that “a definitive interpretation of article VIII (2) (b) would support the IMF in this role even
if it did not have legal effect in national courts” (Eichengreen and Portes, 1995: 50).  The Canadian- 39 -
55 Department of Finance, Canada (1998).
56 The GATT includes provisions for various kinds of safeguard measures.  For example, under the heading of safeguarding
a country’s external financial position or balance of payments, import restrictions may be imposed to forestall a serious decline
in foreign exchange reserves or (in the use of a developing country) to ensure a level of reserves adequate for implementation of
its programme of economic development.  Moreover, safeguard action is also possible in the form of suspension by a country
of its obligations under the agreement to protect a sector from serious injury caused or threatened by increases in imports.  For
more detailed discussion see Jackson (1997: chap. 7).
57 See Group of 22 (1998a: sect. 4.4) and the thrust of the discussion on facilitating the private sector’s involvement in
forestalling and resolving financial crises in IMF (1999: 9–24).
58 Concerning the difficulty of achieving changes in this area voluntarily see Eichengreen (1999: 66–69).  For the proposal that
all lending in foreign currencies include a “universal debt roll-over option with a penalty” to enable the borrower at his own
discretion to roll over such debt for a specified period (Buiter and Silbert, 1998).
Government has gone further, proposing an Emergency Standstill Clause to be mandated by IMF
members.55  However, it would be difficult to avoid delays and panics in any procedure requiring prior
consultations with the Fund.  Moreover, there is a problem of conflict of interest.  The Executive Board
of the IMF is not a neutral body which could be expected to act as an independent arbiter, because
countries affected by its decisions are also among its shareholders.  Besides the Fund itself is a creditor
and a source of new money.  An alternative procedure would be to allow countries meeting certain ex
ante criteria during Article IV consultations to have the right to impose standstills should their currencies
come under attack.  This would be similar to pre-qualification in lender-of-last resort financing discussed
above, and while such a procedure would suffer from the same drawbacks, it would certainly be
superior to a procedure entailing lengthy ex post negotiations with the IMF.
Under another alternative, which is free of the objections to procedures involving sanction by
the IMF, the decision for standstill could be taken unilaterally by the debtor country and then submitted
to an independent panel for approval within a specified period.  Its ruling would need to have legal force
in national courts for the debtor to enjoy insolvency protection.  Such a procedure would in important
respects be similar to WTO safeguard provisions allowing countries to take emergency actions.56
Recognizing the difficulties in establishing internationally agreed standstill provisions, emphasis
has been placed, notably by the Group-of-22 Working Group, on voluntary mechanisms.57  The dilemma
here is that the need for mandatory provisions has arisen precisely because voluntary approaches have
not worked in stemming debt runs.  On the other hand, while a number of proposals have been made
to introduce mechanisms to provide automatic triggers, such as comprehensive bond covenants or debt
roll-over options designed to enable debtors to suspend payments, these are unlikely to be introduced
voluntarily and would need an international mandate.58  Thus, in the absence of a genuine lender of last
resort, an internationally agreed standstill would appear to be the only effective mechanism to stop self-
fulling debt runs.
If they are to have the desired effect on currency stability, debt standstills should be accompanied
by temporary exchange controls over all capital-account transactions by residents and non-residents
alike.  There would also be a need to combine debt standstills with debtor-in-possession financing in- 40 -
59 For example, in the restructuring of the bank debt of the Republic of Korea in January 1998 private debts “effectively
became nationalized via a guarantee by the Korean Government ....  Creditors, for their part, came out better after the rollover than
before: there was no writedown, the new loans carried higher interest rates than the original loans”.  See Radelet (1999: 11).
Similarly, in the Chilean debt crisis of the early 1980s private debts were included in debt rescheduling negotiated between the
Chilean Government and its foreign bank advisory committee, apparently as a result of pressure from this committee including
a tightening of the terms on short-term trade credits (Diaz Alejandro, 1985: 12).
order to replenish the reserves of the debtor country and provide working capital.  This would mean IMF
“lending into arrears”.  The funds required for such emergency lending would be much less than the
scale of bailout operations.  Moreover, the Fund could also help arrange emergency lending from private
capital markets with seniority status.
Legally sanctioned standstills would facilitate debt restructuring negotiations.  For sovereign debt
to private creditors, reorganization could be carried out through negotiations with the creditors, and the
IMF could be expected to continue to play an important role by providing a forum for negotiations
between creditors and debtor governments.  Special arrangements would be needed for bonds, and the
covenants mentioned above would facilitate their restructuring.
For private debtors, government involvement in negotiations would be inevitable when the
stability of the domestic banking system was at stake.  In past episodes of crisis, negotiated settlements
often resulted in the socialization of private debt when the governments of developing countries were
forced to assume loan losses.59  Such practices are not consistent with bankruptcy principles and make
restructuring more difficult.  The introduction of an internationally sanctioned automatic stay, together
with debtor-in-possession financing, could help to relieve such pressures.  Judicial procedures could be
applied to individual debtors according to the law and the forum governing the contracts at issue.  Their
application would be greatly facilitated by the existence of proper bankruptcy procedures in debtor
countries.  Indeed, it would be in the interest of those countries lacking such procedures to establish
domestic insolvency regimes in order to allow an orderly resolution of debt crises and to reduce their
likelihood by reducing uncertainties and raising confidence.
Writing such a standstill mechanism into the rules and conditions governing international
financial contracts would mean that lenders and investors knew in advance that they might be locked in,
should a financial panic develop and a country’s currency come under attack.  This should promote a
better assessment of risks, eliminate moral hazard, and reduce purely speculative short-term capital flows
to emerging markets.  It would also eliminate the need for large-scale bailouts.  Together with IMF
lending into arrears, it would prevent an unnecessary squeeze on the economy and collateral damage for
firms and other economic agents bearing no responsibility for the financial crises, while allowing the
country breathing space to design and negotiate an orderly debt reorganization plan.  Overall, such
orderly work-out procedures would promote greater stability and contribute to a more equitable
allocation of the costs of a crisis between lenders and borrowers.- 41 -
V.  CONCLUSIONS
Given the inherent instability of international capital movements, recent experience shows that
any country closely integrated into the global financial system is susceptible to financial crises and
currency turmoil.  Developing countries are particularly vulnerable owing to their dependence on foreign
capital and their net external indebtedness.  Indeed, the recent bouts of crisis in emerging financial
markets have pointed to the limits of national policy responses for dealing with such crises and have
provoked widespread agreement that there are structural and institutional weaknesses regarding their
prevention and management.  Since systemic deficiencies in the current regime for capital flows and
exchange rates regularly give rise to costly financial crises in developing countries regardless of
institutional and policy differences amongst them, for such countries global financial reform is an issue
deserving top priority.
In an ideal world global arrangements designed for the prevention and management of financial
instability and crises would include (a) some combination of disclosure and transparency by both public
and private institutions, (b) effective surveillance over national macroeconomic and financial policies,
(c) globally agreed but nationally implemented rules for the control of capital flows through oversight
of international lenders and borrowers, (d) an lender of last resort with discretion to create its own
liquidity, and (e) orderly debt work-out procedures in international finance.
However, such a world is still a remote prospect.  So far, efforts to redesign the financial
architecture have been hostage to disagreements among the G–7 countries.  The case for improved
disclosure and transparency is now widely accepted, as is that for strengthened financial regulation and
supervision.  Indeed, in both cases the potential benefits, while real, are often exaggerated.  But there is
more resistance to reform of multilateral surveillance over monetary and exchange-rate policies of the
major industrial countries, and prospects for curbing financial instability through global rules and
controls over international capital movements are  equally bleak.  There is also unwillingness to establish
a genuine international lender of last resort.  Instead, the tendency is to introduce solutions involving
limited increases in the availability of external financing designed to impose discipline on debtor
countries and to keep them on a short leash.  By contrast, political support is growing in the major
industrial countries for more orderly debt work-out procedures, and for involving the private sector in
the resolution of financial crises.
Thus, in the current political environment a feasible strategy offering considerable potential
benefits to developing countries in their search for greater financial stability would involve preservation
of the principle of national control over capital flows together with internationally agreed arrangements
for debt standstills and lending into arrears.  This emphasis on the importance of continuing national
policy autonomy is linked to various features of the earlier discussion of this paper.  Ways have not yet
been found at a global level to eliminate the cross-border transmission of financial shocks associated- 42 -
with greater global financial integration or other pressures connected with capital movements which are
capable of triggering financial crises.  And the international financial system will continue to be affected
in unpredictable ways by ongoing technological and transactional innovation, so that any international
regime involving substantial constraints on policy autonomy regarding the capital account of the balance
of payments risks being overtaken by changes requiring new policy responses.  The need for this
autonomy is an argument against international agreements on capital-account convertibility, international
investment, or wholesale liberalization of financial services.  It also points to caution regarding the
attribution of additional powers over international capital movements to existing global financial
institutions (or to possible new ones which can be envisaged) owing to domination by countries with
strong vested interests in further financial liberalization.- 43 -
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